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Some Problems Under Federal Third-Party
Practice
ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF*

Third-party practice is one of the notable and progressive
features which mark the new federal civil procedure. It permits
a defendant to implead a third party who may be directly liable
to the plaintiff on the claim asserted in the complaint or who may
be secondarily liable to the defendant. By this means circuity of
action is avoided, useless expenditure of time is eliminated, and
the cost of litigation is reduced. The rights of all of the parties
originating out of what is, in essence and spirit, a single controversy, may be adjudicated by a single judgment. Like most of the
reforms inaugurated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
third-party practice was not a novelty. It had been tried in the
crucible elsewhere and had proved successful. It was no longer
even in an experimental stage, for in some jurisdictions it had
been in operation for many years.
In England it was originated in the 1870's, when the present
simple civil procedure was adopted in that country. One of the
earliest cases on the subject came before the Court of Appeal in
1876.1 It involved an action instituted by the owner of a ship
against the charterer to recover demurrage incurred for failure
to unload the vessel with required expedition. The defendant
brought in as a third party the consignee of the cargo, alleging
that the latter had neglected to unload with requisite dispatch
and was, therefore, liable over to the charterer. This procedure
met with the approbation of the court. It should be noted, however, that in England third-party practice may be invoked only
in cases in which the third party is liable over to the defendant,
and then only in the discretion of the court. It does not seem to
extend to cases in which the third party may be primarily liable
2
directly to the plaintiff.
Third-party practice has likewise existed in several states. In
New York it was introduced in 1923, where it is also confined to
* Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States.
1. Swansea Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Duncan Fox & Co., 1 Q. B. D. 644 (1876).
2. English Annual Practice (1939) Order 16A, Rule 1-13, pp. 295-313.
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cases in which the third party is secondarily liable to the original
defendant.8 Due to this limitation a joint tortfeasor may not be
brought in, because of lack of contribution between joint tortfeasors.4 In 1929 Pennsylvania adopted third-party practice in a
liberal form, which enabled the defendant to implead any party
either who was liable over to him or who was jointly or severally
liable directly to the plaintiff." Another precursor of federal thirdparty practice is found in Wisconsin, where it was introduced in
the restricted form in 1935.6

Louisiana for many years has had a practice sui generis. Its
Code of Practice, Articles 37-38, permits a defendant to institute
a "demand of warranty," i.e., a claim against a person who has
contracted to defend the defendant against the claim asserted
against him by the plaintiff. It will be observed that this provision on its face is not intended to cover indemnitors, but merely
parties who have undertaken an obligation such as devolves on a
warrantor under a deed, a liability insurance carrier, and other
persons who are obligated to defend against the claim interposed
by the plaintiff in the action.
Third-party practice has not been entirely a stranger to the
federal courts. It has long been a well established feature of admiralty procedure, where it has been accorded a broad scope and
may be applied to parties directly liable to the plaintiff as well as
to those secondarily liable to the original defendant. Moreover,
in admiralty the defendant may bring in a third party as of
right.7 The matter is not within the discretion of the court. In
addition, by virtue of the Conformity Act, resort could be had to
third-party practice in actions at law in the federal courts sitting
in one of those few states in which such practice was a part of
state procedure.8
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made third-party
practice a regular feature for all civil cases, except the few categories exempted from the operation of the Rules.
3. New York Civil Practice Act, Laws of New York (1923) c. 250, § 193(2).
Travlos v. Commercial Union of America, 217 App. Div. 352, 217 N. Y. Supp.
459 (1926); Driscoll v. Corwin, 133 Misc. 788, 233 N. Y. Supp. 483 (Sup. Ct.
1929); Fox v. Western N. Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289
(1931).
4. Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289
(1931).
5. Pa. Stat. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 12, § 141. East Broad Top Transit Co.
v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192 Atl. 401 (1937).
6. Wis. Stat. (1937) § 26.19(3).
7. Admiralty Rule 56, 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1928).
8. Franklin v. Meredith Co., 64 F. (2d) 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
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The salient provisions of Rule 14, by which third-party practice is governed, are as follows:
"Before the service of his answer a defendant may move
ex parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the
plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him. If the motion is granted
and the summons and complaint are served, the person so
served, hereinafter called the third-party defendant shall make
his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims against the plaintiff, the third-party plaintiff, or
any other party as provided in Rule 13. ...

The plaintiff may

amend his pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against
the third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a
defendant. A third-party defendant may proceed under this
rule against any person not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to him or to the third-party plaintiff for all or
part of the claim made in the action against the third-party
defendant."
The Rule is broad in its scope and comprehends two classes
of cases: those in which the third party is liable to the original
defendant; and those in which he is directly liable to the plaintiff.
Typical of the first category are claims for contribution and indemnity and other forms of secondary liability.9
Some misgivings have been advanced as to whether a defendant who carries insurance against liability for negligence
should be allowed to bring in his insurance carrier as a thirdparty defendant. Fears have been expressed that if he is permitted to do so, the result would be to render nugatory the rule
which prevails in most jurisdictions, that the fact that the defendant in a negligence action carries liability insurance may not
be disclosed to the jury. As a practical matter, however, generally no difficulty should arise in such a situation. In most cases
the insurance carrier undertakes and conducts the defense of the
action in behalf of the defendant. Necessarily, it may thereby
9. See Saunders v. Goldstein, 30 F. Supp. 150 (D. C. 1939), in which suft
was brought by a person who was injured by a nut contained in a confection. The defendants were the owners of the pharmacy in which the plaintiff had purchased the candy and the manufacturer who had sold it to the
pharmacy. The concern from which the manufacturer had purchased the
nuts was brought in as a third party.
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prevent itself from being brought in as a party. In those instances, which form a comparatively small minority of cases, in
which insurance carriers dispute liability on the policy, the defendant may bring in the insurance carrier as a third-party defendant in order to secure an adjudication of his rights under his
insurance policy in the same action in which his liability to the
plaintiff is to be determined. The following observations on this
subject were made by Judge Chesnut in Tullgren v. Jasper:0
"... there may be cases in which a liability insurer could
properly be brought in as a third-party defendant by the insured. In the ordinary case this is not at all likely to occur
because, as is well known, the insurer, where there is no question of its liability under the policy to the insured, defends the
suit for the insured by the insurer's counsel; that is to say, the
insurer is in control of the litigation and its counsel would
ordinarily decline to make the insurer a party. But in case the
insurer denies liability and refuses to defend the action in accordance with its policy, I see no logical reason to deny to the
insured, who is the defendant in a suit, the right to bring in
the insurer as a third-party defendant, where under the terms
of its policy it will be liable over to the insured defendant and
where the judgment against the defendant will establish the
liability of the insurer. Of course in such case the defendant
insurer is entitled to a hearing and trial of any defenses that
it may set up against its liability and it is probable that the
court would order a separate trial of its controversy with its
insured under Rule 42 (b). The primary object of Rule 14 is to
avoid circuity of action and thus to finally dispose in one litigation of an entire subject matter arising from a particular set
of facts."'"
The second group of cases in which third-party practice may
be invoked consists of those in which the third party is directly
liable to the plaintiff. The following test has been formulated by
Justice Luhring of the District of Columbia to determine what
constitutes a proper claim within this category:
"If the claim set out in the third party complaint might have
been asserted against the third party defendant had he been
joined originally as a defendant, it follows that the defendant
10. 27 F. Supp. 413 (D. C. Md. 1939).
11. Id. at 416.
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is entitled, as a third party plaintiff, to bring in such third
party defendant ....

-12

Typical cases in which the third party is directly liable to the
plaintiff are those involving joint tortfeasors. 18 There are other
cognate situations of a varied character. For example, in one case
a pedestrian fell against a cellar door in front of a store and filed
suit against the storekeeper. The defendant brought in his landlord as a third party, on the ground that the latter was in control
of the cellar.1 An interesting series of cases arose out of the
crash of a transport plane, in which several persons were
killed. Suits were brought for the death of some of the victims against the air transport company and the concern which
manufactured the airplane, the latter being charged with negligence in installing a defective cylinder, which was claimed to
have been the cause of the accident. The second of the defendants
then joined the manufacturer of the forging out of which the
cylinder had been fabricated, as a third party, contending that
the manufacturer had been negligent. 5 Perhaps the most extreme
case in which third-party practice was held applicable was one
decided in the District of Columbia. A person injured in an automobile accident sued an insurance company, which carried liability insurance in behalf of the person whose negligence resulted
in the injuries. The complaint alleged that the defendant had
made a special agreement with the plaintiff to compensate him
for the damages that he had sustained. The defendant then
brought the plaintiff's attorney in as a third party, alleging that
the latter was liable to the plaintiff for negligence in failing to
institute suit against the party who had caused the accident
within the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. It was contended that the original defendant's liability to
the plaintiff and the liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff were based on different and distinct claims and did not
constitute a single controversy. This objection, however, was
overruled, and the court permitted the third-party proceeding to
be maintained, on the ground that in essence the two claims arose
out of the same state of facts. 16
It will be observed that Rule 14 provides that a defendant
12. Luhring, J., In Crim v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp.
715, 719 (D. C. 1939).
13. Burris v. American Chicle Co., 29 F. Supp. 773 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
14. Kravas v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
15. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C.
Conn. 1939).
16. Crim v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715 (D. C. 1939).
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"may move" for leave to bring in a third party. It further states
that "if the motion is granted" certain consequences shall follow.
Does this phraseology imply that it is within the discretion of the
court to grant or withhold leave to bring in a third party by the
procedure provided by Rule 14? This question was answered in
the affirmative by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.' The court called attention to the distinction between the
phraseology of Rule 14 and that of Admiralty Rule 56. The latter
provides that the claimant or respondent "shall be entitled" to
bring in any other vessel or person, and, therefore, in admiralty
impleader is a matter of right. The court stressed the peculiar
phraseology of Rule 14, which has just been quoted, and held that
there can be no doubt that it was thereby intended to make the
impleading of third parties discretionary with the trial court. The
court felt constrained by the language of Rule 14 to reach the
conclusion that a defendant might not invoke the Rule as a matter of right, but that whether or not he was to be permitted to do
so lay within the bounds of judicial discretion. It further concluded that an appellate court might not reverse an order denying or granting a motion for leave under Rule 14, except in a case
of abuse of discretion.
Probably, the court had no alternative but to reach the conclusion at which it arrived. There is still room for discussion,
however, as to whether the discretion conferred on the trial court
is to be entirely untrammeled and uncontrolled or whether certain rules or formulae can be developed to guide and govern trial
courts in reaching a determination as to whether or not discretion
shall be exercised in favor of or against granting leave to bring
in a third party. It is to be hoped that the latter will be the case,
because otherwise it is entirely conceivable that, not only will a
diversity of practice arise as between various districts, but also
in many cases the intent of the framers of the Rule may be unintentionally frustrated and liberality of practice defeated.
On some future occasion, when it is determined to undertake
amendments to the Rules, consideration might well be given to
amending Rule 14 so as to make impleader a matter of right, as
it is in admiralty. The satisfactory experience so far had with
Rule 14 would certainly justify such an advance.
A basic problem that arose at the very outset involved the
question as to whether a third-party complaint had to meet federal jurisdictional requirements, such as diversity of citizenship.
17. General Taxicab Ass'n v. O'Shea, 109 F.(2d) 671 (App. D. C. 1940).
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It had been held in those rather limited instances in which the
use of third-party practice had been attempted in the federal
courts under state laws permitting such proceedings, that a thirdparty complaint initiates a separable controversy and that, therefore, a third-party complaint must show diversity of citizenship
as between the parties, if the complaint is not based on a right
granted by the Constitution or an act of Congress. The fact that
federal jurisdiction existed as between the original parties to the
action was not deemed a sufficient basis for the third-party proceeding. 18
Early commentators on the Rules anticipated that this problem would be encountered. 9 The question is one of great practical
importance, for, as was aptly remarked by Judge McClintic, if
a narrow construction were placed upon Rule 14 and it were to
be held that for jurisdictional purposes a third-party claim should
be regarded as a separate controversy, it would be found "that
in the most numerous class of cases in federal jurisdiction the
rule will be absolutely useless."2 0° Judge Chesnut, in discussing

an objection to jurisdiction raised by a third-party defendant,
elaborated the same thought, as follows:
"It is obvious that if the objection is good the scope of application of the rule will be greatly restricted as to third-party
practice, where the general jurisdiction of the court is based
alone on diverse citizenship. Under this class of federal jurisdiction the more usual type of case is where a non-resident
plaintiff sues a resident defendant in the district court. If the
defendant has a right of action over against a third-party as
indemnitor or joint tort feasor, it is likely that the third-party
will be a citizen of the same State as that of the defendant.
And in cases where the third-party may be a citizen of another State, it is not often the case that he can 2effectively be
served with process under the federal statutes."'
The solution of the problem was dependent in turn on the
question as to whether the third-party claim was to be regarded
as an ancillary proceeding incidental to the main action, or
18. Wilson v. United American Lines, Inc., 21 F.(2d) 872 (S. D. N. Y.
1927); Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Line, Inc., 28 F.(2d) 897 (S. D. N. Y.
1928); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Hall, 70 F.(2d) 608
(C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
19. Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure (1935) 44 Yale
L. J. 1291, 1322.
20. Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138, 139
(S. D. W. Va. 1939).
21. Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. C. M. D. 1939).
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whether it was to be deemed as a separate and an independent
suit. If the former view is adopted, then, obviously, it is not
necessary to establish a ground for federal jurisdiction, such as
diversity of citizenship, for the third-party claim. A contrary result would be reached if the second view prevailed. To be sure,
to regard a third-party claim as an ancillary proceeding perhaps
involves some expansion in the concept of what constitutes an
ancillary proceeding. It can hardly be said, however, that the
adoption of this position would do violence to fundamental principles governing ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts. Judge
Hincks made the following pertinent observation on this point:
"It must be noted that the scope of ancillary jurisdiction
depends only upon the subject-matter of supplemental proceeding. The number, identity or relationship of the parties
affected by the supplemental proceedings have nothing to do
with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction over the subjectmatter. Thus it has long been established that ancillary jurisdiction over the subject-matter may obtain even though the
2' 2
supplemental proceeding brings in new parties.

In every case in which the point was involved the district
courts, without a dissenting voice, have upheld federal jurisdiction and ruled that a third-party claim must be deemed ancillary
to the main action and, therefore, does not require a separate
ground for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship
between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant,
28
or between the original plaintiff and the third-party defendant.
Some illuminating remarks on this point are found in an opinion
rendered by Judge Picard:
"Turning to Webster's International Dictionary, we find
that the word 'ancillary' means 'subordinate to or in aid of
another' primary action. Legal definitions are of the same
tenor. It can hardly be said that a suit between third party
plaintiffs in this cause and third party defendants is 'in aid
of' any main action, but it can hardly be denied that it is
22. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112, 115
(D. C. Conn. 1939).
23. Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (S. D.
W. Va. 1939); Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W. D. Pa. 1939);
Kravas v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939); Lewis
v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C. Conn. 1939);
Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S. D. N. Y.
1939); Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458 (E. D. Mich. 1939); Satink v.
Township of Holland, 31 F. Supp. 229 (D. C. N. J. 1940); Gray v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940).
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'subordinate' to that main action and the tendency of the
courts throughout is that in the aid of justice and equity once
the matter has come before the federal courts and the question of venue is not one of paramount importance or is not
affected, the jurisdictional requirements are not looked upon
as insurmountable when no great hardship or inequity is inflicted upon those third parties. In fact neither the question
of jurisdiction nor of the ancillary nature of the proceedings
in those cases which have reached the district courts has interfered with the joining of third party defendants, and our
district courts that have spoken have all gone under the
theory that where there is some connection between the nature
of plaintiff's claim against defendant and defendant's claim
against third parties has some relation, the entire matter
2
should be threshed out once jurisdiction has been obtained." '
Although neither the Supreme Court nor any circuit court
of appeals has as yet had occasion to express itself on this question, which vitally affects the third-party practice rule, the enthusiasm and unison with which the district courts have adopted
the liberal view warrant the conclusion that such may be regarded as the proper interpretation of Rule 14.
The same cannot, however, be said as to venue requirements
in respect to third-party claims.
It seems difficult to discern why a proceeding which is regarded as ancillary for the purposes of jurisdiction should not
likewise be ancillary for all other purposes, including venue. As
was remarked by Judge Goddard, "If there is no necessity for
an independent basis of jurisdiction over the ancillary causes of
action set forth in the third-party complaints, it should also follow that the venue requirements of an independent action need
not be met."25 Some of the decisions to which reference has been
previously made, holding that a third-party proceeding is to be
deemed ancillary, make no differentiation between jurisdiction
and venue, while others expressly include venue. It is submitted
that the doctrine upheld by this line of cases is desirable and
advances that simplicity of practice and avoidance of circuity of
action which the framers of the Rule undoubtedly contemplated.
Shortly after the Rules went into effect, however, it was held
in the Western District of Arkansas that the venue requirements
24. Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458, 461 (E. D. Mich. 1939).
25. Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757, 758
(S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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applicable to an independent action govern a third-party proceeding. 20 It should be noted, however, that this decision preceded the line of cases discussed above, which unanimously hold
that a third-party proceeding does not present a separate controversy, but is ancillary to the action out of which it arises.
Whether, in the light of those decisions, the federal court in Arkansas would have reached the conclusion that it did, is perhaps
questionable.
The line of cleavage between the authorities on the question
of venue was brought to a head by the above mentioned series
of suits arising out of the crash of a transport airplane in which
a number of passengers met their death.2 7 A number of actions
were instituted to recover damages for the death of the victims.
Some of them were brought in the Southern District of New
York, while others were filed in the District of Connecticut. One
of the defendants sought to implead a third party. In each instance it was held that a third-party proceeding is ancillary to
the main action and, therefore, does not require an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction.
In the Southern District of New York the same disposition
was made of the question of venue. 21 On the other hand, in Connecticut a distinction was drawn between jurisdiction and venue,
and the conclusion was reached that, although the proceeding
was ancillary for jurisdictional purposes, nevertheless, compliance with venue requirements was to be exacted in order to
permit the third-party proceeding to be maintained. 2 The two
decisions were rendered a few days apart, and it is reasonable
to assume that neither judge knew of the result reached by his
colleague in the adjoining district. In the Connecticut case it was
held not only that venue requirements had to be met, but also
that a third-party proceeding is to be regarded as not being based
on diversity of citizenship, even if such exists, but on a federal
right. As a consequence, the conclusion was reached that the
provision of the Judicial Code which enables suit based on diversity of citizenship to be brought in the district of which either
the plaintiff or the defendant is an inhabitant might not be invoked, but that suit must be brought in the district of the defend26. King v. Shepherd, 26 F. Supp. 357 (W. D. Ark. 1938).
27. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C.
Conn. 1939). See p. 412, supra.
28. Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S. D.
N. Y. 1939).
29. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. C.
Conn. 1939).
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ant's residence, as required by the Judicial Code in all cases other
than those based on diversity of citizenship. 0 The court went
still further and indicated that, if the original action had been
removed from a state court, federal jurisdiction must be deemed
as founded, not on diversity of citizenship, but on the Removal
Act.
While the weight of authority seems to be in accord with
the view that a third-party proceeding must be regarded as ancillary for all purposes, and that, therefore, neither jurisdictional
nor venue requirements need be met by it, nevertheless, the split
in the decisions just indicated necessarily leads to the conclusion
that the question is not entirely foreclosed, but will have to be
determined by higher authority. Should the rule of the Arkansas
and Connecticut cases eventually prevail, the result would constitute a fruitful source of perplexity. If the third-party defendant resides in the district in which the suit is pending, there will
be no difficulty, for compliance with venue requirements will be
found in the fact that the third-party proceeding is being instituted in the district of the residence of the third-party defendant.
Complications will arise, however, if the third-party defendant
is an inhabitant of another district. If in such event the thirdparty plaintiff resides in the district in which suit is brought, we
are then confronted with a situation in which an action is brought
in the district whereof the plaintiff is an inhabitant. Such an
action may, however, be maintained only if it is based on diversity of citizenship, since otherwise it must be brought in the
district whereof the defendant is an inhabitant. Accepting arguendo the premise that a third-party proceeding is a separate
independent suit for purposes of venue, it would seem logical
to conclude that the action in such an instance is based on diversity of citizenship and, therefore, may be brought either in
the district of the plaintiff's residence or in that of the defendant's residence. The Connecticut case holds otherwise, however,
and on the theory there propounded the third-party proceeding
would not lie. Also, if both the third-party plaintiff and the thirdparty defendant are inhabitants of districts other than that in
which the main action is pending, venue for the third-party proceeding would necessarily be lacking. If the original action had
been brought to enforce a federal right and was not founded on
diversity of citizenship, then indubitably venue could not be laid
80. 43 Stat. 1264 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1927).
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for a third-party proceeding, if the third-party defendant were
an inhabitant of another district.
All of these perplexities will be avoided if the majority rule
prevails and it should eventually become established that venue
requirements need not be met by a third-party proceeding. Such
a consummation would be highly desirable as being in the interests of expeditious disposition of controversies.
Another aspect of third-party practice, which is still to be
explored, relates to third-party claims involving a liability directly from the third-party defendant to the original plaintiff.
The rule provides that the plaintiff may amend his pleadings to
assert against the third-party defendant any claim which he
might have asserted had such defendant been originally joined.
What would happen, however, if, after the third-party defendant
is brought in, the plaintiff declines to amend his complaint and
to proceed against such party? Or, suppose the plaintiff opposes
a motion for leave to serve such a third-party defendant on the
ground that he would decline to assert a claim against him? In
other words, has a plaintiff an option as to whether or not to
prosecute his claim against any third-party whom the original
defendant chooses to bring in, and should he be permitted, if he
so desires, to restrict himself to asserting his claim against the
original defendant? It is entirely conceivable that situations of
this nature may frequently arise. For example, a passenger in
an automobile who sustains physical injuries as a result of a
collision between that vehicle and another car may file suit for
negligence against the driver of the other automobile. The defendant may then bring in the plaintiff's host as a third-party
defendant. The plaintiff may prefer not to assert any claim
against the latter and limit himself to recovery against the original defendant. Does he have such an option? It would certainly
seem to be in accord with conventional and traditional concepts
that no one should be compelled unwillingly to sue another. It
is also consonant with customary practice, in cases in which several parties are liable on the same obligation, to permit a plaintiff
to sue all or as many of them as he chooses at his own election.
On the other hand, it may well be argued, perhaps, that as a
matter of ethics and abstract justice a plaintiff should not be
permitted at will to select one of several obligors and compel
him to carry the entire burden. 81
31. See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence
(1936) 33-41.

Actions
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To revert to the supposititious case just suggested, it may
well be contended that it is unfair for the passenger to seek to
exculpate his host while endeavoring to recover from the driver
of the other vehicle, if both drivers happen to be joint tortfeasors.
There appear to be only three cases decided under the new
Rules in which the court adverts to this phase of third-party
practice. In a case decided in the District of Columbia, Justice
Luhring alluded to the existence of a doubt as to what would be
the consequence if the plaintiff declined to amend his complaint
and to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. He indicated that he was inclined to believe that under such circum32
stances judgment could not be awarded against the latter.
Two cases involving this point were decided in February,
1940, within less than a week of each other, one in New Jersey and the other in the Western District of Louisiana. In the
former"3 Judge Forman held that, if the plaintiff indicates that
he will under no circumstances seek to recover from the thirdparty defendant tendered by the original defendants, the third
party should be dismissed. In the Louisiana case, however, Judge
Porterie held to the contrary. 4 Suit had been brought for personal injuries, caused as a result of a collision between two motor
vehicles. The liability insurance carrier of the party charged
with negligence was named as defendant, in the light of a state
statute which accorded to an injured party a right of action
directly against a liability insurer. The defendant, claiming that
a person other than its insured was a joint tortfeasor, sought to
bring in the insurance carrier of the latter as a third-party defendant. The court adverted to the peculiar rule of Louisiana
law, which provided for contribution as between joint tortfeasors
in cases in which a judgment has been jointly rendered against
all. On the point now under discussion he reached a conclusion
contrary to that of the New Jersey case, indicating that it is immaterial whether or not the plaintiff desires to assert a claim as
against a third-party defendant. The view of the Louisiana case
appears to be that the plaintiff has no option in the matter. Judge
Porterie makes the following observations on this point:
"Rule 14, by its very raison d'etre, precludes a vested right
of election of defendants in the original plaintiffs; the rule
32. Crim v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 26 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. C.
1939).
33. Satink v. Township of Holland, 31 F. Supp. 229. (D. C. N. J. 1940).
34. Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D.
La. 1940).
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permits the defendant, when he converts himself into a thirdparty plaintiff, to bring third-party defendants into the case
not the original plaintiff elected to put them into
whether or
85
the case."
In this connection, it may be of interest to refer to some
rulings of the Pennsylvania courts on this question, in view of
the fact that in that state a person directly liable to the original
plaintiff may be brought in as a third-party defendant. It has
been held in Pennsylvania that the procedure does not contemplate that under such circumstances the plaintiff should
amend his complaint. If the plaintiff recovers, the jury or the
court, as the case may be, must specify whether the additional
defendant is liable over to the original defendant, or whether he
is jointly or severally liable with him to the plaintiff, and judgment is entered accordingly. It would seem to follow that under
such a procedure the plaintiff has no choice as to whether he
should or should not allege a claim against the third-party defendant.5 6
There is no reason to doubt that in the course of time a
satisfactory solution will be found to the problems discussed in
this article. With almost complete unanimity the courts have
been following the admonition contained in Rule 1, that the Rules
"shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action." One is justified in expressing
confidence, therefore, that this precept will likewise guide them
in respect to the open questions involved in third-party practice.
35. Id. at 305.
86. Vinnacombe v. Philadelphia, 297 Pa. 564, 147 At. 826 (1929); First
Nat. Bank v. Baird, 300 Pa. 92, 150 At. 165 (1930).

